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A PROPER BURIAL
Robert L. Tsai*
In his article, Professor Mark Killenbeck defends both
Korematsu v. United States1 and Trump v. Hawaii2 on their own
terms, albeit on narrow grounds. He goes on to conclude that
comparisons of the two decisions don’t hold up. Killenbeck has
authored a thoughtful and contrarian paper, but I’m not sold. In
my view, Korematsu simply isn’t worth saving; in fact, a more
complete repudiation of the internment decisions is overdue.
Trump v. Hawaii, too, must also be revisited at the earliest
opportunity and its more alarming features that abet presidential
discrimination against non-citizens rejected.
Moreover, I believe that comparisons between the two
disputes are warranted. When the two controversies are brought
together, they underscore several themes about our prevailing
constitutional order: whether during war or peacetime, a
president can harm politically unpopular minorities through the
law in a variety of ways, judges consistently have difficulty
reaching consensus to do anything about the unequal burdens
imposed by presidential policies on out-groups, and as a result,
we need stronger reforms that can prevent such harms in the
future.
To begin, I’m genuinely puzzled that Killenbeck would
defend Korematsu as containing a “true core” worth recovering
from the blatant racial stereotyping and sloppy analysis in the
decision. He painstakingly takes apart the analysis offered by
Justice Hugo Black and agrees with me, as well as the deluge of

*
Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. An earlier version of this essay
was offered as remarks as part of a symposium on Killenbeck’s paper for the Balkinization
blog. My thanks to Victoria Abramchuk and Allie Wainwright for their assistance.
1. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Mark R. Killenbeck, Sober
Second Thought? Korematsu Reconsidered, 74 ARK. L. REV. 151, 155, 158 (2021).
2. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 156-57.
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critics over the years,3 that the decision represents not only an
atrocious failure of reason but also one that ratified racial
hostility.4 After all that, what’s left to cheer?
Killenbeck offers two reasons for keeping Korematsu
around: “[it] is an object lesson in bad faith” and the decision
provides “the foundations for the doctrine of strict scrutiny.”5
The first reason, grounded in classroom pedagogy, is
unobjectionable, and most teachers continue to teach the decision
for just that reason. I’m one of them. Some decisions that no
longer represent the state of the law are so reprehensible, and
caused so much social and material pain in their time, that they
must never be forgotten. As a matter of civic education, the
internment cases should be perennially considered and their logic
eviscerated in classrooms. The survival of values such as reason
and equality depend on just this sort of regular performance.
I’ll focus on Killenbeck’s second reason, which rests on a
claim about Korematsu’s continuing importance as law. This
reason, I believe, collapses when one thinks about it, for what he
says is valuable about the decision can be found in less tainted
form elsewhere.
Let us first address Killenbeck’s claim that strict scrutiny
somehow represents a moral statement of our political order. The
fact that a decision may be useful to judges for a doctrinal purpose
is hardly a deep moral statement. Strict scrutiny is nothing more
than a judge’s instrument and a highly formalistic one at that.
It is also a device that is routinely dispensed with when it
becomes an impediment to achieving consensus on a multi-person
body. Indeed, the Korematsu majority made a big deal about
using a form of it, but the approach was nowhere to be found in
3. RICHARD REEVES, INFAMY: THE SHOCKING STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT IN WORLD WAR II 232-33 (2015); Neil Gotanda, The Story of Korematsu, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 250 (Michael C. Dorf ed., Found. Press 2004); ERIC K.
YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT 139-42, 164 (Aspen Publishers ed. 2001); PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 337
(1983); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489,
508-09 (1945).
4. In PRACTICAL EQUALITY: FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION, I contend that
the internment decisions represented “the paradigmatic situation where the usual mode of
debating equality not only proved disastrous for the principle of equality, but also arguably
closed off more diligent efforts to do justice.” ROBERT L. TSAI, PRACTICAL EQUALITY:
FORGING JUSTICE IN A DIVIDED NATION 121-22 (2019).
5. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 189
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Trump v. Hawaii because its formalism is effortlessly
manipulated by nefarious actors to evade accountability. When
one wiggles out of having to find an impermissible “purpose,”
none of the tough tools associated with the mechanism ever come
into play. The spectacular ease, moreover, with which Chief
Justice slips out of heightened review due to context—that the
decision here involves controlling entry into the country—reveals
yet another aspect of its on-again, off-again importance.
Nor is there anything magical about strict scrutiny that
makes it essential to the defense of individual rights.6 There isn’t
deep moral insight contained either in the strict scrutiny construct
or the Korematsu Court’s use of it that couldn’t be extracted from
elsewhere. The ideas that racial animus is antithetical to the rule
of law and violates the principle of equal regard, regardless of
one’s citizenship, had already been laid down in decisions
decades before the federal government decided to round up
people of Japanese ancestry, from cases such as Yick Wo v.
Hopkins7 or Strauder v. West Virginia.8
For those who take comfort in formalism, there are any
number of other rulings that can easily substitute as a signal for
the proposition that a state official’s use of race triggers strict
scrutiny, such as Loving v. Virginia.9 They even serve as better
illustrations of how to do it rigorously.
In truth, using strict scrutiny reflexively could even be
counterproductive, by promoting an unthinking refusal to grapple
with the serious stakes of a constitutional dispute. I’ve had more
than my share of students who get tripped up by the mechanics of
the tiers-of-scrutiny formula and lose sight of the key judgments
entailed in constitutional interpretation that are compressed, and
thereby obscured, by the tool.10
6. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006); Adam Winkler,
Fundamentally Wrong about Fundamental Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 239 (2006)
(“[L]aws infringing upon fundamental rights are subject to strict scrutiny, but only some of
those rights, only some of the time, and only when challenged by some people.”).
7. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
8. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305-06 (1880).
9. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
10. I am reminded of Philip Bobbitt’s diagnosis that modern Equal Protection
jurisprudence has degenerated into “application and commentary revolv[ing] around ‘three
tiers,’ ‘compelling state interests,’ ‘fundamental rights,’ and ‘suspect classification[s]’ to
such an extent that” one might suspend judgment altogether and merely use “a chart by which
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Killenbeck argues that Justice Black’s opinion in Korematsu
gave “further structure and detail” to the test, which encompassed
“a retreat from reflexive disparate treatment of aliens” and “the
gradual embrace of a formal test.”11 Fine, but this kind of
doctrinal tinkering doesn’t render the decision indispensable as
law going forward.
In short, the legal system can carry on just fine without
Korematsu. Whatever little doctrinal value it still has can’t be
extricated from the horrific circumstances or analysis. What’s
more, the precedent had already long been reduced to a cheap
citation for most law clerks in this respect, though it has always
been an odd—even offensive—choice for such routine labor.
Korematsu’s demise as precedent happened due to an
avalanche of moral and legal criticism from academics, activists,
and government officials. So, when Chief Justice Roberts finally
pronounced the precedent dead, that merely recognized that the
politics of repudiation outside of the courts had, in fact, worked.12
Killenbeck retells this part of the story in brief but faithful
fashion, taking pains to point out the ethical lapses on the part of
government lawyers who refused to apprise the Justices that their
own intelligence contradicted their sweeping legal assertion that
Japanese Americans posed a national security threat.13
On the other side of the ledger, the reasons to no longer treat
the ruling as law have piled up over the years. Beyond its status
as a horrendous instance of judicial reasoning on matters of
equality, the fact that Korematsu has remained on the books has
continued to inspire the worst sentiments. While still on the
campaign trail in 2015, Donald Trump invoked FDR’s actions in
proposing a “complete and total shutdown” of Muslims entering
the country and, when pressed, repeatedly refused to say whether
the internment decisions violated America’s values.14 His allies
a justice could locate the constitutionality of a challenged statute or ‘unconstitutionality’ by
following columns of ‘significant interest’ and the like down, and rows of ‘governmental
interest’ and so forth across.” PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 55 (1982).
11. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 191.
12. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018).
13. See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 405-06, 42425 (2011); ROBERT L. TSAI, SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT AND THE POLITICS OF
REPUDIATION 35 (Austin Sarat ed., 2020).
14. Meghan Keneally, Donald Trump Cites These FDR Policies to Defend Muslim
Ban, ABC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2015), [https://perma.cc/QW8X-HK22]; Michael Scherer,
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were not so coy, some of whom happily cited the wartime
precedent in support of establishing a national registry to track
Muslim people.15
For judges and clerks even to sprinkle Korematsu in their
decisions confused people and kindled hope among bad actors
that jurists were keeping access available to a narrow path to
inequality. If anything, Korematsu deserves to be buried with
more fanfare than Chief Justice Roberts gave it, tossed out in the
course of giving a rebuttal to the dissenters’ charges of complicity
in Trump v. Hawaii. Look, the majority said, we aren’t willing to
tolerate animus, and to prove it to you, we are willing to say that
Korematsu as caselaw is too tainted to be cited and promise never
to do it again.16
But if the majority were truly interested in renouncing racebased decision-making and close the loopholes that allow
government officials to engage in it, then why didn’t they also
toss out Hirabayashi v. United States? That ruling permitted a
race-based curfew.17 By getting rid of Korematsu without driving
a stake in the heart of Hirabayashi leaves open the inference that
certain kinds of sweeping race-based measures may still be
permissible.
Pedagogically, the current state of doctrinal uncertainty
elevates the need to teach the curfew decision to tease out what,
if anything, survives as law. For instance, can race or religion be
used to harm a minority population during a time of war? If so,
what about threats or priorities that fall short of live conflict—
such as race-based quarantine rules or religion-based counterterrorism policies? In the future, when can other political
minorities, especially non-citizens, expect to receive
constitutional protection when a president openly announces his
intention to do members of the group harm?
Exclusive: Donald Trump Says He Might Have Supported Japanese Internment, TIME (Dec.
8, 2015), [https://perma.cc/B36N-42SU].
15. Abigail Abrams, Donald Trump Advocate Cites Japanese Internment Camps as
‘Precedent’ for Muslim Registry, TIME (Nov. 17, 2016), [https://perma.cc/MB3D-YA37].
16. Chief Justice Roberts initially accused the dissenters of taking “rhetorical
advantage” of Korematsu and insisted that it “has nothing to do with this case.” Trump, 138
S. Ct. at 2423. He then went on to state that the decision “was gravely wrong the day it was
decided, has been overruled in the court of history, and—to be clear—’has no place in law
under the Constitution.” Id.
17. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 83, 102 (1943).
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***
Let’s turn to Killenbeck’s defense of Trump v. Hawaii on the
merits. Here, his support is tentative and procedural, resting on
the fact that the case “was decided with an incomplete record” as
well as uncertainty as to “exactly how [the ban] has operated and
what its actual impact has been.”18 Killenbeck breathes a sigh of
relief because the ruling has “the arguable virtue of not pretending
that it has anything to do with heightened scrutiny.”19
All of this is true as far as it goes. But it offers comfort only
in the sense that the Court could have created more havoc with
doctrine than it did. What Killenbeck misses is that the Court
failed to take advantage of the opportunity to stake out an
approach that addresses the recurring problems that will surely
continue to arise. After all, we will see more demagogues in the
future. They will also continue to enjoy expert assistance in
scrubbing their illicit programs to make them more presentable.
While judges can’t stop those who lack civic virtue from rising to
power, they do bear some responsibility for minimizing the
damage. Merely regurgitating and applying rationality review is
understandably alarming for the millions of people with family
members who live in other countries.
Killenbeck works hard to wring some good news out of the
decision, but it has the feel of damage control. Killenbeck thinks
it’s a close call but that the Court’s decision is defensible given
some uncertainty in the record. Here he rests heavily on the facial
neutrality of the ban.
I agree that the ruling on the merits is defensible, but only if
one takes as given an exceedingly broad view of executive
discretion over immigration (existing doctrine does give a
president deference when he acts pursuant to congressional
authority to exclude foreigners) and then closes one’s eyes to
plentiful evidence of religious hostility. But we need not accept
all of that as written in stone.
It’s worth noting that the years-long detention of Japanese
Americans caused untold suffering for more than a hundred
18. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 202, 205.
19. Id. at 197. For other, more robust defenses of Trump v. Hawaii, see William P.
Barr, The Role of the Executive, 43 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 605 (2020); Joshua Kemme,
Protecting Religion vs. Protecting Lives: The “Travel Ban,” 45 N. KY. L. REV. 217 (2018).
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thousand people: lost homes, businesses, wages, and educational
opportunities, as well as geographic dislocation and
intergenerational shame. Women gave birth in stables within the
makeshift detention camps. Armed men and barbed wire policed
their existence.
But what we know now about Japanese Americans’
suffering doesn’t make the suffering of Muslims affected by the
multi-nation ban insignificant. The travel ban also caused
material losses and social pain on a massive scale, though it has
been harder to quantify because the people whose lives have been
disrupted for the past four years are scattered across the world.
There has been no systematic effort to assess the transnational
toll, and these human and material costs often remain out of view
of jurists focused so intently on the immediate parties before
them. We are talking of loved ones kept apart, missed jobs and
university degrees, and the stigma of being branded dangerous
because of factors that lie beyond their control—many of the
same things that today cause people to see wartime internment as
a travesty.
Instead of thinking of what is merely defensible, it’s worth
considering what might start to approach the ideal. On that score,
Trump v. Hawaii falls woefully short. It neither puts any serious
roadblocks to religious bigotry nor helps us to smoke out policies
designed to impose unequal burdens on hated minorities through
surreptitious or complex means. If anything, Chief Justice
Roberts created new problems by invoking the First Amendment
seemingly to insulate some of a president’s xenophobic and antiMuslim remarks, instead of characterizing what he had before
him as probative evidence of religious animus.20
He does, however, accord significance to the
administration’s later choice to take Iraq off the list of banned
countries, saying oddly that it was “difficult to see how exempting
one of the largest predominantly Muslim countries . . . can be
cited as evidence of animus toward Muslims.”21 In other words,
the Justices found excuses to discount evidence of pernicious
intent right in front of their eyes while demanding more complete

20. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418, 2420-21 (2018).
21. Id. at 2421.

314

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 74:2

evidence of bias, such as worldwide harm,22 before drawing a
negative inference against the president.
What never changed, from the moment Trump proposed a
Muslim ban as a candidate to the moment he celebrated the
Supreme Court’s 5-4 endorsement of his policy, was the
president’s perception that he wanted to treat Muslim people
differently than people of other faiths. Nor did his message
change as the policy went through different iterations, other than
to grouse that his lawyers made him “water” it down. He never
once renounced his odious goal. The original slate of countries
were 97% Muslim, which meant that they served as excellent
proxies for religion.23
That the administration worked from a list that the Obama
administration had once used is a red herring. The key is why did
Trump and his aides settle on the countries they did and whether
they could justify doing so now, rather than why a previous set of
officials designed the policy they did.
Although the ban went through a few changes, it didn’t
change all that much. The bulk of the countries banned stayed the
same; a couple were later added as fig leaves. This told us that
once he got into office, President Trump was willing to accept a
partial religious ban dressed up by his lawyers to appear more
acceptable to judges. The facial neutrality that lawyers seized
upon to defend the policy was seen as a sham by the president
himself, in whom “[t]he executive Power [is] vested.”24
What kind of judicial decision could be described as better
than merely defensible? One that denied the president an
opportunity to crow that he had given his supporters the Muslim
ban that was promised and thereby fan the flames of anti-Islamic
prejudice. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court validated his effort
to rally anti-Muslim sentiment in the country through a display of
sheer ingenuousness and signaled to others that it was permissible
to mimic his barely-disguised inegalitarian behavior.
22. Not only does Chief Justice Roberts seize on the fact that the policy’s “text says
nothing about religion,” he also states that the fact that “the policy covers just 8% of the
world’s Muslim population” should be counted against any inference of religious animus.
Id. But it is not a requirement that every single member of a group be harmed before an
intent to harm can be drawn.
23. Alan Gomez & Richard Wolf, Federal Appeals Court Skeptical of Trump’s Travel
Ban, USA TODAY (Feb. 7, 2017), [https://perma.cc/X7GT-WWBK].
24. U.S. CONST. art. II.
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Denying these consequences could have easily been
accomplished without tying up a president’s statutory authority to
exclude in the future. One option would have been to engage in
a Cleburne-style gloss on rational basis review in this setting by
rejecting the evidence of national security concerns for justifying
blanket travel bans from these particular countries.25 Such an
approach would have the benefit of invalidating the president’s
policy without branding him a religious bigot, if this is what stood
in the way. The Justices did not take this option, though it was a
plausible one under the exceedingly deferential Mandel
framework created for visa denial situations.26 True reform is
needed to deal with ideological and status-based discrimination
in this context, but that is a discussion for another time.27
Another option would have been to find religious animus
explicitly by invoking the line of cases from the domestic religion
context.28 That would have put the Court in greatest rhetorical
tension with the sitting president, but that too would have done a
better job of juggling the various principles in play than blind
deference.
Killenbeck contends that the evidence of animus is less
plentiful in Trump v. Hawaii, but he never quite says the evidence
is insufficient. It’s true, as Killenbeck points out, that the record
in Korematsu “made it abundantly and undeniably clear that the
government actions at issue targeted, and affected, only persons
of Japanese ancestry.”29 By contrast, the challengers’ theory in
the travel ban case was that the policy was drafted to accomplish
inequality by other means.30 If we care about illicit objectives,
we have to work harder and be willing to look behind the labors
of clever lawyers when they draw up a facially neutral policy.

25. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
26. Under Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972), judges ask only whether an
immigration policy is “facially legitimate and bona fide.” For a terrific examination of the
president’s ascendant power to make immigration law, see ADAM B. COX & CRISTINA M.
RODRÍGUEZ, THE PRESIDENT AND IMMIGRATION LAW (2020).
27. See generally JULIA ROSE KRAUT, THREAT OF DISSENT: A HISTORY OF
IDEOLOGICAL EXCLUSION AND DEPORTATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2020).
28. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993).
29. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 221
30. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2406 (2018).
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But to say that the president’s own consistent and plentiful
expressions of religious bigotry are merely cynical and should be
discounted is to say that serious equal protection challenges can
no longer be successful unless policymakers are too obvious or
stupid about their nefarious designs.
Chief Justice Roberts’ remark that Korematsu “has been
overruled in the court of history” left many other problematic
features of the internment cases undisturbed.31 That leaves open
not only questions about the sincerity of the enterprise (though I
don’t doubt that the justices are unlikely to cite Korematsu in the
future), but also its completeness. First, as mentioned earlier, the
remaining internment decisions were left intact.
Second, nothing was said about Ex Parte Endo, which had
declared that as a matter of statutory law, a concededly loyal
individual could not continue to be held in the internment camp
and must be released.32 Because that ruling reached only the
question of continued confinement of individuals, it did not alter
either Hirabayashi’s or Korematsu’s affirmance of broad-scale
measures that turned on race, much less the constitutionality of
internment policy in the first instance.33
The problem with leaving Hirabayashi intact and Ex Parte
Endo unmodified is that these precedents continue to empower
anyone who might wish to engage in mass targeting or removal
of undesirables. A plausible reading of precedent still seems to
be that a president can get away with acting first—including
possibly using race or some other immutable characteristic if the
need is great enough—and facing consequences later.
***
There’s quite a bit more that can be gleaned from putting
Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii together rather than
contemplating them apart. We learn that, two generations after
the internment cases were decided, a president’s ability to inflict
mass suffering has grown exponentially, rather than diminished.
His arsenal has also expanded, as new bureaucracies such as the
31. Id. at 2423.
32. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 302 (1944).
33. Id. at 297; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
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Department of Homeland Security and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement have emerged, allowing for awesome displays of
state power domestically. These bureaucracies, with their own
staff and lawyers, can hunt down undesirables and facilitate lifesaving care and path-altering opportunities or they can crush them
in cruel fashion. Agents from one department can also be
repurposed for domestic law enforcement activities, such as
quelling protests.34
What’s worse, when executive branch actors decide to rev
up that immense power to harm out-groups, they possess the
means to cover their tracks. DeWitt didn’t feel the need to hide
his anti-Japanese bigotry because he probably felt the sentiment
was widely shared in his day.35 In our own time, it has become
less acceptable to be open about racial or religious animus so we
should expect to see less overt expressions of bigotry, and that’s
to be commended. But it’s also a simpler task for presidential
aides to evade subpoenas or the media, obscure their roles in
developing policy, relying on a many-hands approach that insists
any single nefarious actor’s objective has somehow been blunted
by the participation of others. We need better legal doctrine that
anticipates the executive branch’s enhanced capacity to hide
evidence of their malfeasance.
The incentives for an administration to mistreat political
minorities, too, have grown, as popular movements roil American
life once again. Citizens’ faith in establishment figures and social
organizations wanes, and ordinary people search for strong
leaders—and even strong men—capable of vanquishing their
ideological adversaries. Militant times call for a more responsive
judiciary.
But legal constraints have not kept pace. Our laws and
institutions have proven largely ineffective in preventing
demagogues from acquiring power, or a president hellbent on
harming a political minority from using the law to do so. To the
contrary, judges have done more harm than good by either
explicitly insulating pernicious politics or hiding behind the
complexities of the modern administrative state. Much of current
34. Mike Baker et al., Federal Agents Push into Portland Streets, Stretching Limits of
Their Authority, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2020), [https://perma.cc/3NNP-3RMK].
35. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 173-74.
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legal doctrine has been fashioned with technocrats and publiclyspirited officials in mind, not would-be autocrats or leaders of
ethno-nationalist movements. It continues to be maintained in
this way, without taking into account how much our politics has
changed. That has rendered judges not only ineffectual when it
matters the most, but mere adjuncts to inegalitarian policies.
One of those legacies of these years of turmoil may be more
individuals who run for office as standard bearers of right-wing
or left-wing social movements, or on behalf of conspiracy-based
communities, with all of the attendant problems such dynamics
entail. Both FDR and Trump projected themselves as leaders of
a burgeoning movement of their time. FDR threw his arms
around the labor movement and forged a coalition whose
achievements were driven primarily by the economic needs of
white Americans.36 Black civil rights issues were made a
secondary priority, while Asian Americans, not yet politically
active enough to be a force, comprised a tiny fraction of that
coalition. When white supporters on the West Coast pushed hard
for the internment of Japanese people in part because of enduring
antagonism over economic competition, the lives and welfare of
Japanese immigrants became dispensable to the federal
government.
Trump’s “America First” nationalist movement fused white
supremacist beliefs and paramilitary elements with mainstream
supporters anxious about America’s changing demographics and
culture. From the first day of his campaign to the last days of his
presidency, Trump reminded people that foreigners, people with
non-conforming religious practices, and anti-police brutality
activists were to be treated as enemies of the political community,
while those loyal to a muscular notion of capitalist-libertarian
36. “The money changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our
civilization[,]” FDR roared at his first inaugural address on March 4, 1933. “We may now
restore that temple to the ancient truths.” For FDR, “[o]ur greatest primary task is to put
people to work.” Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in LILLIAN
GOLDMAN L. LIBR., YALE L. SCH., [https://perma.cc/NH4T-9S5J]. By 1944, he was looking
backward at the achievements of the labor movement and forward to finishing the fight
against America’s enemies abroad. When he presented “a second Bill of Rights,” he began
with “the right to a useful and remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or mines
of the Nation” and “[t]he right to earn enough to provide adequate food and clothing and
recreation[.]” Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to Congress (Jan. 11,
1944), in THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, [https://perma.cc/4RKV-A4FB].
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freedom and to the president himself were its friends. Most of his
signature policies and his public rhetoric, along with his corrupt
actions, underscored this friend-enemy distinction. He may not
have taken his anti-Muslim program much further given other
priorities, but he proved to be the highest-ranking elected official
to take the culture war directly to this out-group. For that, he will
always be remembered for what is possible.
Judges don’t often think enough about how future lawyers
and ordinary people will use and misuse their decisions. They
should. The fact of the matter is that once the highest court in the
land endorses a policy, much less the cherished project of a
movement figure, it is then teed up as a plan for future action.
When the Supreme Court showed little resistance to the
mistreatment of strangers, more policies came down the pike. An
emboldened president followed up his victory in the Muslim ban
case by implementing a raft of policies restricting access to
asylum and visas, limiting what immigration law judges could do,
and seeking to punish communities with non-citizens by
undercounting them for the Census. All of these actions were
foreseeable if you understand Trump was a movement president
who understood himself to be pushing legal limits.
His administration cited the Muslim ban to justify a number
of these moves. Other judges, too, soon got into the act. The
Ninth Circuit, relying on Trump v. Hawaii, later upheld President
Trump’s ban on the entry of foreigners without pre-approved
health insurance, validating anti-egalitarian policies in a new
context.37
Another concern raised in both controversies is the risk of
manufactured emergencies. As I have defined elsewhere, a fake
crisis is one where a public policy problem’s “nature or scope is
fabricated or exaggerated beyond reasonable parameters.”38 In
Korematsu, the United States was engaged in a very real hot war
against Japan, but the asserted threat posed by Americans of
Japanese ancestry was grossly exaggerated. Some within the
administration tried hard to manufacture evidence of espionage
37. John Doe #1 v. Trump, 984 F.3d 848, 866-67 (9th Cir. 2020).
38. Robert L. Tsai, Manufactured Emergencies, 129 YALE L.J.F. 590, 592 (2020). A
notable departure from this somnambulant judicial approach toward presidential dissembling
can be found in the census decision, which I discuss at some length in Equality is a Brokered
Idea, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1 (2020).
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but couldn’t find much of anything; credulous judges ate up even
the thin gruel presented.
Likewise, Trump v. Hawaii turned on whether the
government could credibly show that the designation of certain
majority-Muslim countries for blanket exclusions could be
empirically justified. On this score, the justices in the majority
showed themselves to be entirely too trusting by accepting partial
and conclusory evidence of a threat. Their approach makes it a
simple task for mendacious officials to get their way in the future.
In terms of how power is actually wielded, FDR’s
constitutional sins may lean toward omission rather than
commission while Trump’s involve the pursuit of an illicit vision
from the get-go. But both testify to the enormous power the
modern executive branch possesses to inflict harm on unpopular
minorities. Instead of strictly supervising inferiors, FDR deferred
to his Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Lieutenant General
John DeWitt, who relied on exceedingly thin evidence that
Japanese Americans posed a real risk to national security.39 In
that sense, the threat from Japan was real and imminent, but the
danger from people of Japanese ancestry living in America had
been largely fabricated. As Killenbeck reminds us, DeWitt was
quite open about his prejudiced belief that “[a] Jap’s a Jap,” that
the “racial strains are undiluted” in people born with Japanese
ancestry no matter how long a person had lived in the United
States, and that “an exact separation of the ‘sheep from the goats’
was unfeasible.”40 Working within the structure created by
Congress, lawmaking power was delegated to military officials to
govern the streets, which was then deployed in ways that singled
out people of Japanese ancestry for special sanctions.
By comparison, President Trump was transparent about his
inegalitarian designs from the outset. He demanded that his aides
fulfill his number one campaign promise and populated key posts
with people like Jeff Sessions, Stephen Miller, Mike Pompeo, and
(briefly) Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, who shared his anti-Muslim
beliefs. Examined in this light, we actually have a more

39. IRONS, supra note 3, at 57-58.
40. Killenbeck, supra note 1, at 162, 172; Harrison Smith, Aiko Herzig Yoshinaga,
Whose Research Led to Internment Reparations, Dies at 93, WASH. POST (July 26, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/2P6D-BNPE].
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compelling portrait of high-level responsibility for policies
devised to inflict unequal harm. In fact, a former lawyer from the
Office of Legal Counsel expressed regret for her role in
whitewashing religious bias. She was refreshingly honest, saying
that her own “portfolio . . . included matters targeting
noncitizens.”41 She acknowledged that even the successive bans
were “discriminatory” but that more time with lawyers “narrowed
them but also made them more technocratic and therefore harder
for the courts to block” under existing doctrine.42
By upholding a blanket policy that fell unequally on a single
group, both Supreme Court decisions did something else that was
similar: they raised the costs of ferreting out discrimination. Just
as the internment rulings allowed the government to round people
up and forced loyal citizens to sue for release by demanding a writ
of habeas corpus, so too the Muslim ban decision forced
individuals affected by the ban to show bias in her own case, or
to prove the existence of so pervasive a pattern of visa denials that
discrimination must be inferred. We may never know how many
Muslim people were discouraged by the bans from even seeking
a visa. Whether individual lawsuits can prevail at all remains to
be seen, but there’s little doubt that pushing equality-based claims
almost exclusively into the as-applied format has made them
harder and more expensive to litigate.43 For most, it won’t even
be worth the effort. President Trump’s efforts, with the
cooperation of the High Court, ensured that the ban remained
intact for his entire presidency.
The bottom line: from the perspective of egalitarianism,
both Korematsu and Trump v. Hawaii made things worse by
making it easier for government officials to disregard their
obligations.
I want to be clear about something: Killenbeck in no way
endorses presidential harassment of unpopular minorities. Nor
does he embrace authoritarianism or any other anti-democratic
41. Erica Newland, I’m Haunted by What I Did as a Lawyer in the Trump Justice
Department, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2020), [https://perma.cc/2RBR-FDAR].
42. Id.
43. Plaintiffs would have to rely on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886),
but satisfy the tougher glosses put on as-applied arguments given by cases like Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 242, 246-48 (1976), and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
315-19 (1987).
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ethos. In fact, if anything, what separates us may be his faith that
getting rules right will mean that decisionmakers will get
outcomes right. But I fear that his telescoped defense of these
two cases may wind up replicating approaches and habits that
prevent us from seeing the whole picture or the need for reform.
And that dismal picture remains one where presidents enjoy
largely unrestrained authority to harm unpopular minorities,
while other institutions stand idly by.

